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THE WILLOWBROOK WARS. By David J. Rothmant and 
Sheila M. Rothman.2 New York: Harper & Row. 1984. Pp. 
405. $27.95. 
PhilipP. Frickey3 and David I. Levine4 
This book tells the story of the Willowbrook State School, an 
abysmal state institution for the mentally retarded located in New 
York City, and of the litigation that forced the state to move many 
residents from the institution into small community group homes. 
It recounts the history of one of the most well-known institutional 
reform cases in the country. The book also provides an account of 
the implementation of a complex consent decree. It is worth read-
ing by students and teachers of constitutional law alike. 
Surprisingly, the book delivers more than it initially seems to 
promise. Its jacket (although not its cover) contains a subtitle-A 
Decade of Struggle for Social Justice-sure to raise the hackles of 
any reader concerned about judicial activism. Such a reader would 
not be assuaged by the authors' descriptions of themselves in the 
first chapter. For example, David Rothman admits being "more 
deeply involved in policy questions than most historians."s He is on 
the boards of the New York Civil Liberties Union and the Mental 
Health Law Project.6 Similarly, Sheila Rothman acknowledges 
having "little patience for discovering the reading of a constitu-
tional clause that would convince a federal judge to intervene when 
the evidence of an institution's inhumanity should spark some sort 
of ameliorative action."1 She is "[b]y training ... a social worker 
who recognized that a lengthy confinement in a custodial institution 
was almost always psychologically destructive."s In other words, 
she has a strong bias in favor of deinstitutionalization, one of the 
most sensitive issues in the Willowbrook controversy. 
I. Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine, Professor of History, and Direc-
tor of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons, Columbia University. 
2. Research Scholar, Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University. 
3. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
4. Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
5. D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra, at 3. 
6. These affiliations arose out of the publication of his 1971 book The Discovery of the 
Asylum, a study of the origins of prisons and mental hospitals. /d. at 3-4. 
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8. !d. 
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One ought not judge this book either by its jacket or by the 
authors' candid self-descriptions. The Rothmans provide a reason-
ably careful and generally balanced look at both the Willowbrook 
story and some of the larger issues in institutional reform litigation. 
What of the subtitle on the jacket? In one sense, it is probably accu-
rate: the Willowbrook "wars" did range over a decade, and that 
institution was so shocking that only the most hardened disciple of 
Felix Frankfurter or Alexander Bickel could cringe at labeling this 
litigation a "struggle for social justice." In any event, dispassionate 
or even cynical readers should not allow the subtitle to irritate 
them, for they can learn much from the Rothmans if they ignore 
what is probably only Harper & Row's effort to sell more books. 
I 
In 1972 Willowbrook was a disaster. It was grossly over-
crowded with retarded children and adults. Staffing was minimal. 
Staff pay was so low and working conditions so unpleasant that ab-
senteeism was rampant. The institution was filthy, and hepatitis 
and shigella were common. Residents moved about naked or in tat-
ters; feces often adorned the walls. Not only were therapy and med-
ical care largely nonexistent, residents commonly suffered injury 
due to the acts of themselves or others. In short, Willowbrook was 
a human dumping ground. 
The Rothmans attribute these conditions in part to the orienta-
tion of the psychiatrists in charge of New York State's Department 
of Mental Hygiene. According to the authors, these doctors all had 
a triage mentality about the allocation of their admittedly scarce 
medical resources. The doctors saw the Willowbrook residents, 
many of whom were severely or profoundly retarded, as incurables 
akin "to the senile, the chronic schizophrenic, the brain-damaged 
alcoholic." These physicians "believed that available funds had to 
go first to the hopeful-to the curable mentally ill."9 This result 
was reinforced, the Rothmans suggest, by their 
deep-seated prejudice against the retarded .... [P)sychiatrists had been taught that 
the failure of their discipline, more particularly the failure of the mental hospital, to 
deliver on its promise to cure patients was mostly due to the inability to separate the 
... treatable from the non treatable. . . . For psychiatry to achieve its proper rank in 
medicine, it had to maintain a rigid distinction between rehabilitation and cus-
tody. . . . Put in this context, Willowbrook was the price that had to be paid for 
advancement elsewhere. Squander resources on its incurables, and psychiatry in 
general and the treatable patients in particular would never progress. 10 
9. /d. at 25. 
10. /d. at 25-26. 
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The charge that the retarded were willfully neglected is explosive, 
but the Rothmans present their indictment credibly, buttressed by 
citations to lectures, interviews, and writings by, with, and about 
two of the three named psychiatrists. 11 
A few reform-minded physicians and staff working at Willow-
brook, along with some parents of children who resided there, be-
gan the effort to improve conditions. Picketing and marches got 
some media attention but no results. Dissatisfied staff arranged for 
a raid on the institution by television journalist Geraldo Rivera and 
a camera crew. In typical fashion, though, after the media exposed 
and castigated Willowbrook for a while, the story was dropped. Fi-
nally, Willowbrook parents, sympathetic professionals, and civil lib-
erties lawyers-including Mental Health Law Project co-founder 
Bruce Ennis, who would become lead counsel-participated in a 
"Policy and Action" retreat. All concerned shared "a widespread 
and well-warranted distrust of going to the New York legislature[,] 
the body that had neglected Willowbrook for years."12 The consen-
sus was that a lawsuit was the only practicable remedy. 
Even before the complaint was filed, a major issue arose con-
cerning the nature of the relief to be sought for Willowbrook resi-
dents. Should the federal court simply be asked to require the state 
to run a clean, safe and habitable institution? This was the goal of 
many Willowbrook parents, who could not take their children back 
home and knew of no acceptable alternative to institutionalization. 
Others, however, including many professionals in retardation-re-
lated fields, had a more radical vision: the retarded had a "right" to 
live in the least restrictive residential alternative possible. To these 
reformers, even the severely retarded should be treated like ordi-
nary people to the extent possible. Thus, these persons pushed for 
"normalization," under which the retarded would be returned to 
the community to live in small group homes or in foster care that 
would allow them to experience life in the real world. Based on 
intuition more than scientific proof, community placement advo-
cates asserted that the retarded could not progress in any large insti-
tution; even severely retarded people needed the stimulation of daily 
life activities, not merely custodial care. 
The civil liberties lawyers embraced normalization as compati-
ble with their abiding distrust of large institutions and of the segre-
gation of the powerless. In the end, the lawyers' choice was critical 
because they were in command of remedial as well as litigation 
strategy. During the preremedial stages, however, these differences 
I I. /d. at 25-26 (footnote at 381 ). 
12. /d. at 59. 
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of opinion about the proper relief to be sought did not sharply di-
vide the parents from other supporters, in part because everyone 
agreed something had to be done and in part because it was not then 
clear that such a sharp dichotomy in remedial goals existed among 
those in the plaintiff camp. 
The Rothmans report that the plaintiffs' attorneys purposely 
filed the complaint along with a motion for emergency relief in fed-
eral court late on a Friday afternoon, operating on the myth "that 
liberal judges work longer and harder, and thus are more likely to 
be in chambers" at that time.IJ Instead of drawing Judge Jack 
Weinstein, whom they most desired, however, the case ended up 
with Judge Orrin Judd, a moderate Nixon appointee. Early in the 
litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys asserted that their clients had a con-
stitutional "right to treatment" that was being denied at Willow-
brook. No doubt some supporters of the litigation-many 
Willowbrook parents among them-hoped that this doctrine would 
lead the federal court to turn Willowbrook into a true educational 
and treatment facility rather than a warehouse for those who came 
out last in triage. The Rothmans note, however, that "[m]any law-
yers, including Ennis, wanted to use the doctrine as a way of empty-
ing mental hospitals; confident that the states would never be able 
to make the institutions therapeutic, they saw right to treatment as 
a tool for prying patients loose from horrendous settings."l4 Again 
it seems that the mixed and somewhat conflicting interests of those 
involved in the litigation were not fully recognized, much less 
resolved. 
Judge Judd rejected any constitutional right to treatment. He 
did discover a constitutional right to protection from harm, how-
ever, found it violated at Willowbrook, and ordered some immedi-
ate improvements. The result pleased no one; the state resented the 
intrusion, and at least some on the other side of the suit feared that 
in the long run Judd would only "make Willowbrook into a safer 
warehouse."1s The parties trusted their own bargaining skills more 
than the judge, and after months of negotiations the plaintiffs and 
the state agreed upon a consent decree. 
Among other things, the consent decree created a panel to 
monitor compliance consisting of seven persons-two chosen by the 
state, three by the plaintiffs, and two by the panel itself. Through a 
combination of shrewdness by plaintiffs' counsel and inattention by 
the state, proponents of deinstitutionalization filled not only the 
13. /d. at 64-65. 
14. /d. at 54 n. •. 
15. /d. at 90. 
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three spots chosen by the plaintiffs, but also the two positions 
picked by the panel. Although a variety of disputes arose during 
the period in which the monitoring panel was in existence, none 
approached the importance of the question of the degree to which 
the consent decree obligated the state to place Willowbrook resi-
dents in the community. The Rothmans report that although the 
state and plaintiffs' counsel had agreed on the language of the con-
sent decree concerning deinstitutionalization, they failed to appreci-
ate their differing approaches to this goal. The state, in essence, 
thought it was obligating itself to the use of group homes to the 
extent feasible; plaintiffs' counsel, on the other hand, were commit-
ted to community placement of every Willowbrook resident and the 
closing of that institution. In the end, it was the monitoring panel's 
strong commitment to deinstitutionalization, not the bare language 
of the consent decree or any contested judicial order, that by 1983 
resulted in half of the plaintiff class-2600 persons-being in com-
munity placement. (Twelve percent had died, seventeen percent re-
mained in a Willowbrook still objectionable on many grounds but 
nonetheless improved due to the litigation, and the others were in 
other institutions.) 
The state's efforts to comply with the consent decree and with 
the monitoring panel's edicts illuminate many of the difficult 
problems of achieving institutional reform in modern America. Ac-
cording to the Rothmans, a number of capable individuals-many 
either brought into state government or reassigned for this pur-
pose-performed invaluable service in implementing the consent 
decree. However, they faced a hostile state bureaucracy that was 
threatened by the changing conditions. Indeed, bureaucratic reor-
ganization was required-the creation of the Office of Mental Re-
tardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) separate from 
the entrenched Department of Mental Hygiene-to free the hands 
of highly placed officials committed to complying with the consent 
decree. Some of the Willowbrook staff, fearful of losing their jobs as 
a result of deinstitutionalization, did what they could to sabotage 
community placement. But even without unusual bureaucratic fet-
ters the task of implementing community placement was formida-
ble. State officials cajoled nonprofit organizations that had never 
before cared for the retarded to run foster care programs and group 
homes. The officials led these groups through the maze of state re-
quirements, helped locate sites for group homes, and did their best 
to quell community opposition. 
The Rothmans assert that, in the end, the deinstitutionaliza-
tion program was remarkably successful. No group home, once 
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open, was the object of vandalism or even picketing; the homes of-
fered decent accommodations and services in acceptable neighbor-
hoods; there was no evidence that group homes decreased 
surrounding property values or otherwise damaged neighborhoods; 
vigilant monitoring of the homes demonstrated that the wide major-
ity provided services of high quality to their residents. Most impor-
tant, and perhaps most surprising to the casual observer, is the 
Rothmans' clear conclusion that the retarded-even those severely 
afflicted-are functioning much better and learning many more 
"life skills" in this setting. 
Along the way, however, the judicial commitment to institu-
tional reform waivered dramatically. In 1980 the New York legisla-
ture refused to continue funding for the monitoring panel. Judge 
John Bartels, who had taken over the case after the death of Judge 
Judd, ordered the governor and OMRDD to fund the panel or suf-
fer contempt. The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that, in re-
questing legislative appropriations for the panel, the governor had 
fulfilled his duty under the decree to use best efforts "to ensure the 
full and timely financing of [the] judgment, including, if necessary, 
submission of appropriate budget requests to the legislature."I6 In 
further litigation, plaintiffs requested a special master11 to take over 
the functions of the defunct panel. The state countered with a re-
quest to modify the decree to allow it to place Willowbrook resi-
dents transitionally in settings larger than the ten to fifteen bed limit 
originally agreed upon. The district court granted the plaintiffs' re-
quest and denied the state's, but again the Second Circuit re-
versed.Is The court of appeals upheld the lower court's 
appointment of a special master, but determined that the state's re-
quested modification should be granted. It stressed that even in the 
context of the modification of a consent decree, substantial defer-
ence must be paid to the professional judgment of state officers. 
This judicial reluctance to overrule a state's preference for in-
stitutionalization rather than community placement finds support in 
a prior Supreme Court opinioni 9 and is likely to continue in the 
future. 2o Indeed, in a later decision the Second Circuit has seem-
16. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 
1980) (emphasis added). 
17. See generally Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Mas· 
ters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C.D. L. REV. 
753 (1984). 
18. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 277 (1983). 
19. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
20. The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), reinforces a limited judicial role in scrutinizing treatment of the insti-
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ingly slammed the door on any constitutional right to a least restric-
tive residential alternative.21 The court recognized that the 
institutionalized retarded have certain constitutional rights in the 
institution-the right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical 
care, safe conditions, freedom from undue bodily restraint, and 
training sufficient to preserve basic self-care skills from deteriorat-
ing. The court emphatically rejected, however, "an entitlement to 
community placement or a 'least restrictive environment' under the 
federal constitution."22 Rather, the Constitution is satisfied if "a 
decision to keep residents [institutionalized] is a rational decision 
based on professional judgment."23 
II 
Since the germinal article by Professor Chayes in 1976,24 a host 
tutionalized retarded. In Cleburne Living Center, the Court refused to apply some version of 
heightened equal protection scrutiny to classifications based on mental retardation, despite 
the fact that the institutionalized retarded share some of the same characteristics as other 
groups that have received special judicial solicitude under the equal protection clause. This 
deference to legislative prerogatives concerning the retarded strongly reinforces the 1984 de-
cision of the Second Circuit in Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, see notes 
21-23 infra and accompanying text, which rejected any constitutional right of the retarded to 
live in the least restrictive environment. 
The Court in Cleburne Living Center did, however, invoke the rational basis test to im·al-
idate a municipal ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home 
for the retarded. The Court concluded that "requiring the permit in this case appears to us to 
rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." Id. at 3260. This holding 
seems consistent with the theory that only "public values," not just any reason, must be 
rationally fostered by legislative classifications. See id. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring); 
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984); Sunstein, 
Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. Cr. REV. 127. 
After Cleburne Living Center it is clear that a community's fear of the retarded is not a public 
value that can justify a classification disadvantaging the retarded. Thus, Cleburne Living 
Center indicates that, although a state legislature might have constitutionally sufficient rea-
sons for not placing the retarded in group homes, if the legislature does decide to embrace a 
policy of normalization, any steps taken at the municipal level to thwart the implementation 
of that goal will be vulnerable to constitutional attack. This outcome bears some resemblance 
to the concept of "structural due process" or "due process of lawmaking," which suggests 
that judicial scrutiny of a public policy ought to depend in part upon how broadly based and 
democratically legitimate is the entity that adopted the policy as well as upon how carefully 
that entity considered the relevant factors. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong. 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 
( 1976); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest 
City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373 (1978); Sanda1ow, Judicial Protection of Mi-
norities, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 269 ( 1975). 
21. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
22. Id. at 1248. 
23. I d. at 1249. The court cited a number of other decisions in accord with this conclu-
sion. See id. 
24. Chayes. The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 
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of scholarly writings has focused on institutional reform litigation.2s 
From Chayes onward, most commentators have described this form 
of public law litigation as raising sensitive issues of the legitimacy of 
judicial activism. To some, this kind of lawsuit threatens the legis-
lative prerogative of allocating scarce resources among competing 
concerns and the executive prerogative of administering the law.2 6 
Others stress the institutional advantages of judicial intervention. 
For example, Chayes suggests that the parties can adequately pres-
ent the relevant information upon which a decision must be made 
and that judges have some structural advantages over the legislature 
and the executive branch: they are nonbureaucratic and insulated 
from political pressure; unlike the legislature and executive branch, 
they are obliged to respond to grievances; they can tailor flexible 
remedial relief to fit particular problems; and they are "governed by 
a professional ideal of reflective and dispassionate analysis of the 
problem [and are] likely to have had some experience in putting this 
ideal into practice." Yet he also raises some serious practical ques-
tions, such as whether the disinterestedness of the judge can be sus-
tained when the judge "is more visibly a part of the political 
process," whether the unspecialized trial judge can handle the com-
plex issues in such cases, and whether the insensitivity of the legisla-
ture or the bureaucracy to a particular problem "represents a 
political judgment that should be left undisturbed." Moreover, 
Chayes notes that "although courts may be well situated to balance 
competing policy interests in the particular case, if as is often true 
the decree calls for a substantial commitment of resources, the court 
has little basis for evaluating competing claims on the public 
purse."21 
Does The Willowbrook Wars inform this debate? In some ways 
this case was typical of the institutional reform genre. Plaintiffs 
were suffering grievous harm on account of the state and had no 
(1976) (hereinafter cited as Chayes I]. Professor Chayes has updated and revised his views. 
See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Bur-
ger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982). 
25. Current bibliography may be found in 0. FJSS & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 
827-30 (2d ed. 1984); Levine, supra note 17; Levine, Calculating Fees of Special Masters, 37 
HASTINGS L.J. 141, 142 n.5 (1985). 
26. See, e.g., Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978); 
Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?, 6 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 129 (1982); Mishkin, 
Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, Separation 
of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1978). 
27. Chayes I, supra note 24, at 1307-09. There have been some attempts to answer 
these questions empirically. See. e.g., M. REDELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982). But see 
Levine. Book Review, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1983) (questioning some results of M. Rebell 
& A. Block on methodological grounds). 
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hope of obtaining legislative relief. Remedial relief was achieved by 
a consent decree, not through a judicial order imposed upon the 
parties. As has happened elsewhere, the parties negotiated the con-
sent decree against the backdrop of a judicial finding of liability and 
the threat of an imposed remedy. Moreover, under the decree the 
court, through a monitoring panel, had ongoing responsibilities to 
ensure compliance. More in reaction to the judicial affront to its 
power than to the scandalous conditions at Willowbrook, the legis-
lature reasserted itself at a later stage. Finally, the appellate court 
curbed what it took to be some undue judicial activism by the dis-
trict court. In the end, according to the Rothmans, the litigation 
benefited a great many people and irreversibly altered public policy 
in New York. 
As exemplified by Willowbrook, the life cycle of institutional 
reform litigation has very little to do with constitutional theory. 
Scholarly articles often present constitutional law as a majestic pro-
cess in which neutral and highly skilled judges discern enduring 
principles through a combination of deep knowledge of key legal 
precedent, rigorous philosophical inquiry, historical sensitivity, and 
appreciation for modem social concerns. What turns the tide in 
institutional cases, however, is not grand theory but fact-cold, 
hard human suffering on a level no judge with even minimal sensi-
bilities can abide. As the Realists saw long ago, abhorrence of a 
wholly unacceptable status quo comes first, and theory comes later, 
if ever, and only as a peg upon which the court hangs its remedial 
hat. The preachers of judicial restraint have a strong theoretical 
point, especially when discussing federal court intrusion into state 
prerogatives. However, it seems that the federal judge's oath to 
abide by the Constitution includes, at least for many judges, an im-
plied oath to abide by some minimum level of conscience. So it was 
with Willowbrook; the Rothmans report that Judge Judd was loath 
to impose institutional relief until he had seen Willowbrook for 
himself. One gets a similar impression about the Alabama institu-
tional reform cases not only from a reading of the opinions of Judge 
Johnson but from a review of his commentary on the subject: the 
facts spoke loud and clear, and theories were created to justify the 
remedies imposed.2s 
In the final analysis, institutional reform litigation forces a 
policymaking partnership, in which the threat and occasional actu-
28. See Johnson. The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation. 32 ALA. L. 
REV. 271 (1981 ); Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REV. 
903 ( 1976). For examples of cases where poor results may have been achieved because judges 
refused to pay attention to such facts, see J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 
(1976). 
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ality of judicial intervention can prod public officials to address 
problems that have been neglected. We would not join those who 
have labeled the judical activism in this setting as unprincipled. 
Rather, it seems to us that it is more properly seen as nonprincipled: 
the court's conception of fundamental human values, although 
often not tied to a fancy constitutional theory, can upset a repulsive 
status quo and compel public officials to take action. Because re-
form is frequently the result of consent decrees-to be sure, some-
times the outgrowth of judicial jawboning-the courts often need 
not even attempt to dress up their value judgments in constitutional 
garb in a written opinion. In such settings, the courts have left the 
Land of Neutral Principles and have explicitly become ombudsmen 
for the least powerful members of society. 
Apart from its shaky legitimacy in the eyes of some influential 
constitutional theorists, what's so wrong about a system that forces 
society to remedy problems that otherwise would go unaddressed? 
Perhaps nothing, if we can somehow be certain that the state offi-
cials are wearing the black hats and all the plaintiffs wear white 
hats. Even then, the limited resources available to solve social 
problems are spent in an ad hoc manner, depending on which group 
brings which piece of institutional reform litigation. In any event, 
in modern life things are rarely so clear. Willowbrook provides a 
classic example: plaintiffs' counsel appeared to be attacking an 
abominable institution and only asking for humane treatment of its 
residents; yet their true goal was to close the institution, not to clean 
it up. The Rothmans, who admit their own preference for deinsti-
tutionalization, concede that the value of this concept was unclear 
when counsel adopted it as their remedial goal. The Rothmans also 
recognize that many persons in favor of improving life for Willow-
brook residents were opposed to placing the severely retarded in the 
community. It is no comfort that these disputes about the goals of 
the litigation were resolved by plaintiffs' counsel, not by relatives or 
legal guardians of the class members. 
The Rothmans are surely correct in stating that these cases "by 
their very nature have something of a runaway quality about 
them."29 Consider these fundamental questions they raise: 
Who has the right to speak for disabled persons, especially when, as in the case of 
Willowbrook, the vast majority are unable to speak for themselves? The parents-
who, until the expose, suffered from personal and political constraints that rendered 
them immobile or who had never gone out to visit Willowbrook or their children? 
The state-which had let the facility degenerate' The legislature-which made 
budget cuts with impunity? The professionals-who accredited the institution even 
29. D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra, at 359. 
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at its most inhumane?30 
That the attorneys ended up with this authority largely by default is 
certainly no reason to believe that their vision of a better world par-
ticularly deserved to be presented to the court, especially as the uni-
fied position of the class.31 The Rothmans' ultimate conclusion-
that "no mechanisms exist, beyond the court itself, to ensure that 
the public interest is being served"32-is surely as true as it is dis-
turbing. And even in the glow of hindsight, plaintiff counsels' (and 
the Rothmans') belief that across-the-board deinstitutionalization 
was in the public interest can be sharply criticized, as it has been for 
example by Joel Klein, an attorney who frequently represents par-
ents in reform litigation involving the institutionalized retarded.33 
Even with all of these problems, Willowbrook was in one sense 
an "easy" case: the facts spoke for themselves and begged for some 
sort of relief. Many harder cases can be imagined in which a state 
institution is doing an arguably respectable job, but plaintiffs (or 
their attorneys) believe it has not embraced the most modem or 
effective techniques.34 It is difficult to find any supportable rationale 
for judicial intervention when reputable and credible experts plausi-
bly defend the institution's policies and practices and the facts do 
not evoke the deep emotional reaction of a Willowbrook.35 
III 
For both students of constitutional law and of institutional re-
form litigation, The Willowbrook Wars is a useful case study. The 
book provides a good, hands-on appreciation of what happens when 
lofty constitutional arguments are applied in the real world in an 
30. /d. at 63. 
31. See generally Garth. Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 
77 Nw. U.L. REV. 492 (1982); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 
1183 (1982) (discussing the ethical problems facing class counsel). 
32. D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra, at 360. 
33. Klein's critique is contained in his excellent book review of The Willowbrook Wars, 
which is found in THE NEW REP., Feb. 4, 1985, at 28-32. For a collection of other sources 
suggesting that community placement is not always the answer, see New York State Ass'n for 
Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d at 971 n.l9. 
34. For example, M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 27, at 147·74, describe an unsuc-
cessful attempt to convince a federal court to find the defendants in violation of the Constitu-
tion for failing to adopt a novel educational theory that would have required an extensive 
bilingual-bicultural program for Chicano school children in a rural Colorado school district. 
If adopted, this wholly untested theory would have required the defend~nts to furnish such 
services as extensive health care, clothing, and legal representation as part of the remedial 
education program. 
35. Moreover, in striving to ensure that the institutionalized are treated as people, 
courts and reformers alike ought not forget that defendants in such cases are people as well-
people who are often well intentioned and who have professional reputations that can be 
sullied, at least in some circles, by a weak case as well as a strong one. 
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effort to help disadvantaged persons. The Rothmans do not fully 
address the many theoretical and empir' cal issues surrounding insti-
tutional reform litigation generally, but they ought not be criticized 
on that score, because that is not what they set out to do. Besides, it 
would be hollow to critique them in this way when no scholar in the 
law or the social sciences has ever satisfactorily accomplished that 
goal. It is also somewhat beside the point to attack them for expres-
sing a rather clear bias in favor of deinstitutionalization, since rarely 
can scholarly observers be free from strong opinions when the sub-
ject of their inquiry is something as emotionally charged as Willow-
brook. We are certainly better off when observers forthrightly 
present their biases and beliefs along with their findings, rather than 
attempt to pose as disinterested scholars or experts.36 So long as 
readers remain aware of both the authors' objectives and their per-
spectives, they will find much to be learned in The Willowbrook 
Wars. 
36. For one example of a situation where the experts were not so willing to be forthright 
about their perspectives and biases, see A. LEVINE, LoVE CANAL: SciENCE, POLITICS AND 
PEOPLE 133-73 (1982) (describing role of ostensibly disinterested scientists, who actually had 
undisclosed conflicts of interest, in evaluating whether victims of the Love Canal disaster had 
suffered impairment to their health). 
